

Message Text

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NODIS

CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY ROGERS FROM SCHAUFLE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MZ, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL

1. IN GREETING ME AT BEGINNING OF TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR MEETING, MACHEL CAME QUICKLY TO POINT THAT SOUTHERN AFRICAN MATTERS ARE MAIN FOREIGN POLICY PREOCCUPATION OF GPRM, THAT HE DOES NOT WISH TO SEE SOUTHERN AFRICA BECOME A ZONE OF ARMED CONFLICT, IN WHICH IT NOW APPEARS BE HEADED. HE SAID THAT SINCE US-GPRM HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, HE FELT IT HIS "DUTY" TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND TO PEACE OF THE AREA.

2. I THEN MADE MY PRESENTATION, BEGINNING WITH NAMIBIA, THEN MOVING TO RHODESIA, FOLLOWING PREPARED TALKING POINTS MORE SELECTIVELY THAN WITH KAUNDA AND NYERERE. MACHEL LISTENED ATTENTIVELY, JOTTING DOWN VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSALS AND NOTING QUESTIONS HE WISHED ASK LATER.

3. NAMIBIA. MACHEL TOO WANTED BEGIN WITH NAMIBIA. HE HAD HEARD I HAD MET WITH SWAPO IN LUSAKA, AND

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HE HAD IMPRESSION YOU HAD TOO - I TOLD HIM YOU HAD NOT,

DUT THAT YOU BEING KEPT INFORMED THEIR VIEWS.
MACHEL FULLY REALIZES HE BEING ASKED TO COOPERATE BY
SEEKING INFLUENCE NUJOMA AND SWAPO TO AGREE TO MEET
WITH SOUTH AFRICANS.

4. MACHEL'S PROBLEM ARISES OVER POSSIBILITY THAT
MEETING MAY INCLUDE GROUPS OTHER THAN SWAPO AND
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA. MACHEL'S POSITION IS
THAT SWAPO IS THE SOLE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING THE
PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA, AND POINTS TO UN AND OAU
RESOLUTIONS WHICH IN HIS VIEW SUPPORT HIS CONTENTION.
HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE GENEVA CONFERENCE LIMITED TO
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO, ALTHOUGH HE
AVOIDED SAYING THIS WAS A CONDITION FOR HIS WILLINGNESS
COOPERATE WITH US.

5. I EMPHASIZED THAT DETAILS OF MEETING COULD BE
WORKED OUT LATER. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT WE
GET PROCESS GOING, WHICH COULD RESULT IN ACHIEVEMENT
OF INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA, WHICH HE AGREED WAS
GPRM'S ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. BEFORE WE LEFT SUBJECT
OF NAMIBIA, MACHEL SAID THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO CONVINCE
SOUTH AFRICA TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENCE,
PRESUMABLY WITHOUT CONDITIONS, AND TO FIX A DATE
FOR INDEPENDENCE. ONCE THAT ACCOMPLISHED, MACHEL SAID
OTHER QUESTIONS WERE NEGOTIABLE, BY IMPLICATION IN-
CLUDING THE MODALITIES OF CONFERENCE. HE SAID THAT HAD
BEEN FRELIMO'S BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING INDEPENDENCE FROM PORTUGAL.

6. RHODESIA. MACHEL READILY AGREED THAT RHODESIA
IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE TO RESOLVE THAN NAMIBIA.
HE DISPUTED MY STATEMENT THAT PROSPECTS FOR NE-
GOTIATING A SETTLEMENT ARE BETTER THAN FOUR MONTHS AGO.
HE THINKS SMITH IS DELIBERATELY STEPPING UP
CROSS BORDER RAIDS IN ORDER TO FORCE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
TO SEEK OUTSIDE HELP TO BOLSTER THEIR DEFENSES,
HOPING THEREBY TO DRAW THE BIG POWERS (THE US AND USSR)
INTO THE ZIMBABWEAN ISSUE. MACHEL SEES US COMING TO SMITH'S
DEFENSE IF THE SOVIET UNION STEPS UP ITS MILITARY SUPPORT
TO MOZAMBIQUE. MACHEL DID NOT SAY AS MUCH, BUT I CONCLUDED
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HE MAY HAVE ASKED USSR FOR MORE HELP IN TRAINING MOZAMBIQUE'S
ARMY AND TO ESTABLISH AN AIR FORCE. MACHEL
SAID THAT
MOZAMBIQUE IS SOVEREIGN AND IS FREE TO TAKE WHATEVER
ACTION IS NECESSARY TO SECURE ITS DEFENSES.

7. I TOLD MACHEL THAT I DID NOT KNOW IF SMITH
WANTS US TO INTERVENE IN RHODESIA. WE WILL NOT.

THE ONLY THING THAT WILL INFLUENCE US
IS THE PRIOR INTERVENTION OF OTHERS, AND THEN HE CAN
BE SURE WE WOULD TAKE DIRECT ACTION. I STRESSED
THAT IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE WE WISH TO AVOID CON-
FLICT FROM SPREADING THAT USG IS REDOUBLING ITS
EFFORTS TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

8. MACHEL BEGAN THEN TO QUESTION ME CAREFULLY ABOUT
WHAT WE HAD IN MIND. HE ASKED "WITH WHOM THE
ZIMBABWEANS WERE TO NEGOTIATE," COMING BACK TO THIS QUESTION
SEVERAL TIMES. HE ALSO WANTED TO KNOW
WHAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE MADE FOR POLICING
ZIMBABWE DURING TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE. WHOSE
FORCES WOULD BE USED? ACCORDING TO MACHEL, THE PERIOD
OF TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE IS CRUCIAL. STRNG
CENTRALIZED AUTHORITY IS NEEDED DURING THIS PERIOD
TO AVOID INDPSCIPLINE, DISRUPTION OF ECONOMY,
SABOTAGE, CRIME,ETC. MACHEL SAID EVEN 9 MONTHS
TRANSITION IN MOZAMBIQUE WAS TOO LONG. I INTERJECTED
THAT PROLONGED FIGHTING THERE WOULD RESULT
IN THE VERY SAME CONSEQUENCES. MACHEL NODDED AS IF
IN AGREEMENT BUT SAID "I WOULDN'T COMMENT."

9. MACHEL SAID THAT ABSENCE OF UNITY AMONG LIBERA-
TION MOVEMENTS DID NOT CAUSE PREVIOUS BREAKDOWN IN NE-
GOTIATION. ONLY SMITH TO BLAME. AS RESULT
WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE, AFRICANS LOST A FULL YEAR
OF FIGHTING.

10. MACHEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
ARE NOT UNITED. HE ADMITS THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO
CIVIL WAR AS IN ANGOLA. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE DOES
HE WISH ANOTHER ANGOLA IN RHODESIA."WE WILL DO ALL
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WE CAN TO PREVENT THIS. THIS IS THE CORNERSTONE
OF OUR POLICY."

11. AFTER I NOTED THAT US IS TRYING TO HELP IN SOLVING
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROBLEMS BUT, WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF
THE PARTIES, IS LIMITED IN WHAT IT CAN DO, MACHEL CAME BACK
TO THESIS THAT THE WEST IS RESPONSIBLE FOR EVENTS
IN RHODESIA. NOT JUST SOUTH AFRICA, BUT ALSO THOSE
SELLING OIL, WEAPONS, AND TRADING WITH RHODESIA IN-
CLUDING USG. HE SAID US CAN HELP BY BRINGING PRESSURE ON THOSE
STILL TRADING WITH SOUTH AFRICA. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT
AFRICA FRONT-LINE STATES, IN TURN, WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS
TO RE-ESTABLISH UNITY AMONG ZIMBABWEAN LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS. IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER DETAILS, LIKE THOSE
ABOVE, THERE WAS NOT COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT OUR

EFFORTS, BUT THERE WAS NOT OBJECTION TO PROCEEDING. I INFORMED HIM OF YOUR UPCOMING MEETING WITH VORSTER AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT TO AFRICA, INCLUDING MAPUTO, IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. WHEN I EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE WELCOMED, HE NODDED.

12. TWICE MACHEL ENUNCIATED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE US WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON NAMIBIA, THE US AND THE UK FOR DEALING WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON RHODESIA AND THE FRONT-LINE STATES FOR DEALING WITH SWAPO AND THE ZIMBABWE NATIONALIST LEADERS. I CONCURRED, NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT THE UK HAD AGREED THAT THE US WOULD TAKE THE LEAD AND THAT THE US WOULD HAVE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE FRONT-LINE STATES.

13. COMMENT: I BELIEVE WE GOT AS MUCH OUT OF MACHEL AS WE COULD AT THIS JUNCTURE. HE SHOWED A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND, IN FACT, WAS MORE PRECISE IN MANY WAYS THAN KAUNDA OR NYERERE. SINCE HE HIMSELF SPELLED THESE OUT TWICE DURING THE CONVERSATION AND DID NOT REJECT THEM WE HAVE TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS THAT HE ACCEPTS THEM AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH HE, LIKE NYERERE, DID NOT ADDRESS ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GUARANTEES
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OR THE POSITION OF THE WHITES, ALTHOUGH HE INDICATED AGREEMENT WHEN I SAID THAT AFRICANS DID NOT SEEM TO WANT TO PUSH THE WHITES OUT.

14. WITH THE MOST RECENT EXPERIENCE OF ASSUMING INDEPENDENCE, HE WAS MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN DETAILS SUCH AS WITH WHOM THE NATIONALIST LEADERS WOULD NEGOTIATE, THE POSSIBILITY OF DISORDERS DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG GOVERN-

MENT, AND THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE PRESENT RHODESIAN FORCES AND THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS. AS WE ARE ALREADY AWARE HE WILL BE A DIFFICULT ONE TO PERSUADE WHEN WE GET DOWN TO DETAILS.

15. HE DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY WHEN I SAID THAT THE US WOULD RESPOND IF THERE WERE FOREIGN INTERVENTION BUT I AM CERTAIN THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING AS WAS EVIDENCED BY HIS ASSERTION THAT MOZAMBIQUE WANTS NO ANGOLAS IN RHODESIA.

16. WE HAVE MADE A START WITH MACHEL, BUT, GIVEN

HIS KNOWN IDEOLOGY AND REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL THERE CAN
BE NO ASSURANCE YET THAT HE WILL BE A HELPFUL

INFLUENCE IN THE PROCESS. THE FACT THAT HE ACCEPTED
THE APPROACH ON NAMIBIA INCREASES, I BELIEVE, HIS
RECEPTIVITY TOWARD OUR MOTIVATIONS AND EFFORTS
REGARDING RHODESIA. HOW THAT WILL PAY OFF REMAINS
TO BE SEEN.
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